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Epistemic modesty, ostentatiousness and the
uncertainties of epigenetics: on the
knowledge machinery of (social) science
Martyn Pickersgill
Abstract: Epigenetic processes are garnering attention in the social sciences, where
some scholars assert their importance for theorizing social life. I engage with such
ideas here by drawing on interviews with leading bioscientists. To begin with, I
underscore the (productive) uncertainties of those working in and around epigenetics;
I describe these as a manifestation of ‘epistemic modesty’, and suggest that dissensus
helps to propel biomedical innovation. Then, drawing on the concept of ‘alien science’,
I detail some researchers’ ambivalences regarding the notion of ‘transgenerational
inheritance’; their dissatisfaction with the (public) communication practices of other
scientists (situated in what I term a regime of ‘epistemic ostentatiousness’); and
the challenges faced when moderating societal discussion of epigenetics in ways
that expand excitement whilst deﬂating (what researchers regard as) unrealistic
expectations. The paper concludes with reﬂections on the knowledge machinery of the
(social) sciences, and employs the study data to interrogate sociological engagements
with epigenetics.
Keywords: epigenetics, transgenerational inheritance, public engagement, alien science,
collaboration, knowledge machinery, epistemic modesty
Introduction
At a cultural moment when many scientists are rehearsing concerns about the
fragmentation of disciplines and over-specialization, epigenetics – as an idea, an
approach, and maybe a ﬁeld – has come to be seen by a range scholars as having
the potential to cast a bright light upon the ontogenies and ontologies of human
being(s). In particular, some argue that this will be through novel rapprochements
between disciplines. As biologists Patrick McGowan and Moshe Szyf argue:
Epigenetics could serve as a bridge between the social sciences and the biological
sciences, allowing a truly integrated understanding of human health and behaviour.
(McGowan and Szyf, 2010: 71)
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Social scientists too have been participants in conversations about the implica-
tions of epigenetics, including for their own knowledge machinery. As Nikolas
Rose has observed, ‘[n]o longer are social theories thought progressive by virtue
of their distance from the biological’ (Rose, 2013: 4). Perspectives on this as-
sertion would, of course, vary depending on which (sub)discipline of the social
sciences one happened to be considering. Yet, the corridor talk, blog discus-
sions and conference presentations that have played out in recent years are cer-
tainly suggestive of an expectation – or, perhaps more accurately, an enthusiasm
(cf. Will, 2010) – that the choreography of sociological theory should involve at
least some dancing with biology. In the case of epigenetics speciﬁcally, Nicolosi
and Ruivenkamp, for example, conclude that this ‘could be a new paradigm’ with
the potential to ‘support humanities [scholars] and social scientists in their anal-
yses and interventions’ (Nicolosi and Ruivenkamp, 2012: 318). While the possi-
bility of ‘experimental entanglements’ (Fitzgerald and Callard, 2014) between
sociologists and biologists is compelling, discussions nevertheless sometimes
elide scientiﬁc uncertainties around epigenetics – and, hence, what collaboration
might look like in practice, and what it might achieve.
This paper engages with this elision by drawing on semi-structured inter-
views conducted as part of a Wellcome Trust-funded study concerned with
how notions of ‘responsibility’ were being conﬁgured within epigenetics.
Through this research, I wanted to understand how leading scientists were
being enjoined to engage with policymakers and publics and reﬂect on the
implications of their research, the forms that this took, and how this in turn
shaped their sense of ‘responsibility’ (to their discipline, their colleagues, and
to wider publics) – as well as what kinds of ‘responsibilities’ ﬁndings from
epigenetics itself might imply for institutions and citizens. However, in spite
of the growing visibility of research on epigenetic processes, as the interviews
commenced it soon became clear that my respondents’ experiences of policy
and public engagement were not extensive, and their thoughts on the robustness
of extant research were cautionary. Whilst rich data around responsibility
(in its various forms) was certainly produced through the interviews, another
issue emerged that ﬁrst demanded close attention and consideration. To
put it plainly: was ‘epigenetics’ even a thing from which implications could
develop?
It is this question, then, that forms the starting point for my analysis. In what
follows, I document some of the uncertainties and variance encountered in my
interviews (and elsewhere), before moving on to discuss how the scientists I
spoke with conﬁgured these as relevant to wider public engagement. I conclude
with considerations of how my data underscores the centrality of regimes
(cf. Moreira and Palladino, 2005) of ‘epistemic modesty’ (Will, 2010) and
what I term ‘epistemic ostentatiousness’ to the knowledge machinery (Moreira
et al., 2009) of the biosciences. I note how some research in epigenetics can
be conﬁgured as a kind of ‘alien science’ (Collins, 1999; Hedgecoe, 2006), and
reﬂect on the implications of this for the workings of the social sciences.
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Methods
This paper draws upon, as its primary data, interviews with leading UK re-
searchers working in areas deﬁned by themselves or other inﬂuential actors as
pertaining to epigenetics. It is further informed by conversations with other sci-
entists in the UK and North America, and ongoing examination of editorials,
reviews and correspondence around epigenetics published in major journals.
Participants were contacted via targeted emails, after being identiﬁed through
their authorship of highly cited articles, presence on relevant Editorial Boards,
and receipt of major grants relating to epigenetics, methylation or chromatin.
The interview sample was restricted to senior scientists in major institutions in
order to include only respondents who could reasonably be expected to provide
perspectives on how their ﬁeld had developed, critical reﬂections on the work
currently gaining attention within it, and deliberate thoughtfully on the ethical
and social implications of research termed ‘epigenetics’. This sampling strategy
produced a reasonably small population of potential respondents, and ten inter-
views in total were conducted with full professors across ﬁve research-orientated
universities.1
Interviews were semi-structured, moving in different ways (and to varying
extents) across a topic guide that included questions and prompts pertaining to:
(1) deﬁnitional and epistemic issues in epigenetics (including what the word was
taken to mean, and the respondents’ views on debates around ‘transgenerational
inheritance’); (2) scientists’ experiences of public and policy engagement (for
instance, whether the interviewees had participated in any public events, what
their contributions to those had been, and what had initiated their involvement);
and (3) the societal and ethical implications of the respondents’ own and others’
research (eg, if and how organizations like the Nuffield Council on Bioethics
should respond to epigenetics, and what kind of emergent issues bioethicists
ought to address). Interview encounters (ie, total length of time spent discussing
issues with participants) lasted between 30 minutes and just over one hour.2
Interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed thematically.
What is epigenetics?
Struck by the variety of position pieces on epigenetics in the scientiﬁc literature
(Pickersgill et al., 2013), in most of my interviews I asked: what does the term
‘epigenetics’ mean to you? Responses – unsurprisingly, given the debates within
the journals – were varied, and some participants reﬂexively listed the different
deﬁnitions available. As Respondent 8 answered:
So, epigenetics to me means three sorts of things really. The ﬁrst one is Waddington’s
deﬁnition, how the genotype gives rise to the phenotype, and [ . . . ] that’s now called
developmental biology really. There’s the heritability one, which is the most popular,
I would say, which is the idea that it’s inheritance of erm characteristics in a quasi-
genetic manner, but without any genetic changes. And the third use of it is as the study
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of the epigenome. So the epigenome being all of the bells, and whistles, and chemical
modiﬁcations attached to DNA, but with an honorary place for RNA as well, so that’s
a muchmore molecular deﬁnition. And the reason why I separate that from the second
one, is that many of these, most of these marks have not been shown to be heritable. So
there’s no obligatory heritability about them. So those are the three usages. But the one
that is attracting most attention is the middle one. The one about heritable changes.3
Respondent 9 likewise cited Waddington (the developmental biologist usually
credited with coining the term ‘epigenetics’ in the 1940s), before moving on to
discuss broader understandings of epigenetics:
Well, it depends on whether I’m thinking rigorously or thinking sloppily so thinking
rigorously, I would use Waddington’s deﬁnition which is it’s a trait which is inherited
butwhich is apparently not encoded in theDNA.Er, now people use the term epigenetic
to refer to almost any modiﬁcation of a histone protein and chromatin, and certain
modiﬁcations of the DNA.Whether they are truly epigenetic is another issue, so if you
modify the histones in a particular way to make the chromatin in a particular region
silent, is that actually inherited?Well, sometimes yes, and sometimes no, so, but people
are quite happy to use the term because I think it sounds sexy, so they like it.
Respondents 2, 6 and 10 similarly located their deﬁnitions in terms of inheritance:
‘the most important aspect of epigenetics is that it’s somatically inherited. That is
the key thing’ (Respondent 2); and, ‘from my point of view, the most important
thing about epigenetics is it has to be heritable’ (Respondent 6).
Respondent 7 also emphasized heritability, stating that he ‘accept[s] the strict
deﬁnition that some epigenetic information is information which is heritable
either through cells or generations, and not directly coded in the DNA’. How-
ever, at the same time as he thought ‘people should always keep that in mind as
the strict deﬁnition’, he was prepared to expand this in order to accommodate
his own interests. In so doing, he could go about his research unhampered by
some of the more profound ontological debate that appeared to be shaping and
directing the work of other participants:
I don’t probably use [the term epigenetics] in the way that a lot of people in the ﬁeld say
it should be used. I mean, people are quite semantic about it. Erm, I tend to use it quite
loosely, partly because you know you’ve got a choice of saying you work on epigenetics
or chromatin. You know, one of them tends to get people excited. The other one tends
to turn people off a bit. So, so I use epigenetics, but erm I don’t worry too much about
all this, you know, ‘to be epigenetic it has to be heritable’ business. I mean, I can see
why people, I can see why people want to deﬁne it that way. But I think it’s okay to use
it more loosely provided you know what you’re talking about.
Likewise, Respondent 5 was ‘very happy with the breadth of the way [the term
epigenetics is] now used. I think that’s entirely right’. He maintained that ‘the
important thing is to get across this fundamental message that-that-that genes do
what they’re told. And epigenetics is-is the process by which genes are told what
to do.’ As wewill later see, some of the scientists interviewedwere troubled by this
message when it was circulated within the public sphere. Further, it is precisely a
‘loose’ or ‘broad’ use of the term epigenetics that can sometimes be regarded as
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problematic for knowledge-production and the clariﬁcation of complex biologi-
cal processes, as this exchange with Respondent 3 underscores:
Respondent 3: [ . . . ] the term ‘epigenetic’ has changed a lot in the last er, in the last year.
Martyn: Yeah, I’ve noticed that.
Respondent 3: So originally we called epigenetics themethylation of theDNA, and then
people put the acetylation of the protein, the histone, that was a kind of classic, but
today they call epigenetics every change in the expression of the gene, er which is not
due to a change in the nucleotide, in the DNA. And with all the work from ENGAGE
[a large European Commission project on genetic epidemiology] and the others, now
they considered that the non-coding RNA of different species of that, microRNA, cir-
cular RNA, blah blah blah. All this non-coding RNA, as it modiﬁes the expression can
be considered as epigenetic factors. So we are in the situation where the term epigenet-
ics er means [things that are] extremely different for people. Er and in my view the term
is er, is probably wrong today. Because all the people who are working on non-coding
RNAs, say now that they do epigenetics. So it’s a problem.
Respondent 6 was particularly critical of some of the research that today was
referred to as ‘epigenetics’, deeming some of it ‘intellectually lazy’. As he
reﬂected: ‘I think most people claiming to work in epigenetics are not epige-
neticists and haven’t a clue how it works or how it doesn’t work’. Seeming to
gesture to the work of Michael Meaney and Moshe Szyf at McGill University
(Weaver et al., 2004) – which is especially visible in wider commentaries on epi-
genetics – he asserted:
You have the science, which I really hate, where allegedly you rub the head of a pup and
you change its epigenetic proﬁle. It’s nonsense. I mean if there’s something physiological
going on it’s not because of the epigenetics it’s the epigenetics are a reﬂection of that[.]
Respondent 8 was likewise critical of some of Meaney and Szyf’s studies on
pup licking behaviour and the brains of individuals who had committed suicide
(eg Weaver et al., 2004; McGowan et al., 2009). These were discussed in strong
words, with the data from the former study described as ‘weak’ and ‘[s]uspect’,
and the latter ‘massively underpowered’ and ‘unacceptable’. Respondent 8 was
‘happy to believe that early experiences are important’, but ‘not happy to be-
lieve that there’s any evidence that this is mediated by DNAmethylation or other
epigenetic marks’.
Nevertheless, in spite of the potential problems raised by conceptual opacity
around the term ‘epigenetics’, and the prominence of so-called ‘weak’ science,
Respondent 8 still felt that good research could be undertaken:
The point I would make at this-this juncture is that, all of the issues raised by all the
different sorts of epigenetics are cutting edge issues. We don’t really understand devel-
opment at the molecular level in any comprehensive way. We, we, there is the possibil-
ity that things are inherited, that are not genetic. It’s not clear how important this is
biologically, but this is an interesting area. And the epigenome, we don’t really under-
stand what all those marks and things do, so if you, rather than ﬁghting about which
deﬁnition you want to support, er I prefer the stance that, all three of them are really
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interesting biologically. All deserve further work and er so however you deﬁne it, it’s
interesting.
Indeed, Respondent 6 – perhaps most caustic of all the interviewees in his views
regarding much work termed ‘epigenetics’ – seemed to suggest that a corollary
of a settled deﬁnition would be the petering out of research in this area:
I think if we were to stop changing our deﬁnitions and ﬁnally stick with one, and decide
this is it, probably, it would not last because more than likely it’s going to fall down to
some situation.
More generally, though, a keenness to engage with complexity and uncertainty,
and the practices of knowledge-production these conceptual issues propelled,
was tangible:
I ﬁnd the whole ﬁeld really exciting. You know, we have hundreds, not thousands, hun-
dreds of different epigenetic marks. We don’t really know that much about how they
work. And I would say, I don’t see epigenetics as a separate ﬁeld. I don’t think it’s really
a subject, actually. You know, biology is a subject, and er I’m interested in how genes
are regulated, and epigenetics is a, a branch of that enquiry, if you want to use the word.
And many people don’twant to use the word, because they feel they’re just getting into
a quagmire once they do that. So, and I don’t use it all that much. (Respondent 8)
In sum, my interviews underscore a range of ontological ambiguities regard-
ing ‘epigenetics’. Such ambiguity situates research around epigenetics within a
similar epistemological trajectory to that charted by Rheinberger (2010) for ge-
netics (see also Barnes and Dupre´, 2008). In particular, Rheinberger argues that
conceptual imprecision within science does not necessarily impede epistemic in-
novation – rather, it can be a powerful engine for research. The interview data sug-
gest the applicability of this contention for studies relating to epigenetics, where
the variability of the term constitutes a productive (and for some, exciting) ambi-
guity enabling different approaches and research questions to proliferate (Lloyd
and Raikel, 2014a, 2014b). When Respondent 9 speaks of the ‘sexiness’ of epi-
genetics, he intimates one attractant to this area of research, and hence propel-
lant of ambiguity: speciﬁcally, the considerable (economic and symbolic) capital
accruable for work in this area, and the self-conscious movements by various
scientists to situate their investigations in ways that make them eligible for such
investments.
Transgenerational inheritance and scientific un/certainty
In biomedical, social scientiﬁc and humanities accounts, the term ‘epigenetics’
is commonly traced back to the early twentieth century and the British embry-
ologist Conrad Waddington. However, as shown above, the term today is not
transparent: it is used ambiguously to refer to a ﬁeld, amechanism and an effect –
and deﬁnitions abound. As Respondent 3 reﬂected, the ‘boundary [of epigenetics
is] exploding’; consequently, ‘we have absolutely no idea what epigenetic means
today’. Yet, both formalized and functional deﬁnitions are possible – and even
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if their variety contributes to both epistemological disunity within the scientiﬁc
community and the individualized uncertainty that Respondent 3 underscores,
this may itself be productive (cf. Rheinberger, 2010; see also Feyerabend, 2011;
Pickersgill, 2014).
The word ‘heritable’ is frequently deployed within these deﬁnitions. Its inclu-
sion is not a requirement, but its import is hard to ignore. The notion that par-
ticular biochemical marks may be inherited across organismal (rather than just
cell) generations is more radical, however, and has sparked excitement and debate
within biomedicine and beyond. What is commonly referred to as ‘transgenera-
tional inheritance’ has been discussed extensively in recent years. Indeed, one of
my interviewees suggested that the editors of key journals have actively cultivated
such discussion: ‘Nature, Science and Cell, the big three, love it [ie the concept of
transgenerational inheritance]. And they solicit papers about that. And they also
have er, an affection for any paper that shows that’ (Respondent 8).
Given the excitement associated with transgenerational inheritance, in my in-
terviews I sought opportunities to invite reﬂection on its facticity.4 Rather than
the enthusiasm that can easily be divined beyond biomedicine, the respondents
tended to ‘hedge their bets’ or were openly critical of the notion of transgener-
ational inheritance – as well as of studies purporting to evidence it. Even Re-
spondent 4, who said that ‘it is hugely exciting to think that [transgenerational
inheritance] might be going on’, felt it important ‘to look at the evidence very
carefully [ . . . ] and in a neutral kind of fashion’.
Respondents 5, 9 and 10 were more cautious about the possibilities of trans-
generational inheritance; as Respondent 9 put it, ‘it deﬁnitely can happen, but
does it happen on every kind of mark? No, absolutely not.’ For Respondent 5:
I mean, can epigenetic characteristics be passed on er from one generation to the next?
Well, possibly they can. That’s still controversial. I think they probably can, but erm,
you know, it’s an area that’s being researched and has been argued over for probably
200 years, since Lamarck. Erm . . . But, it-it will be resolved, but I don’t think it’s
fundamental.
Such caveats and perhaps agnosticism enabled the scientists to go about the
business of rigorous knowledge-production in their own speciﬁc areas, without
grander conceptual questions surrounding the entities under consideration inter-
fering in this (cf. Star, 1985; Pickersgill, 2014).
Respondent 2was also somewhat agnostic, and appeared to lean towards scep-
ticism about the possibilities of transgenerational inheritance:
I guess if I was to putmy cards, you know saywhich, if I had to jump oneway or t’other,
because I think it is controversial and I think it’s quite uncertain at this stage, and I
think there’s evidence pro and con. Erm my feeling is against it. So I mean without
question there is epigenetic variability between individuals, but whether that’s trans-
generationally inherited [ . . . ] I think the jury’s still out. I think there are examples that
look as though it could be, but I think they could actually potentially be explained by
underlying genetic change that’s been meiotically inherited and is then driving it.
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Respondents 6 and 8 were most overtly critical of the idea that transgen-
erational inheritance could be taken for granted. Throughout the interview,
Respondent 6 justiﬁed this critique in three different ways. His most pragmatic
justiﬁcation involved implying a lack of reproduction of the studies that claimed
to evidence it (a familiar trope within biomedicine). He lamented this, saying ‘un-
fortunately in science, if you publish ﬁrst that gets embedded, and it’s very hard
to shift it afterwards. And it’s important that you do’.5 Respondent 6 also ar-
ticulated a speciﬁcally methodological concern with studies suggesting the pos-
sibility of transgenerational inheritance, which rendered their claims problem-
atic. He argued that other scientists’ studies on environmental exposures were not
persuasive since
the way they’ve done the experiment was a bit like you know the Russian doll, right?
So what you’ve done is you’ve taken the female rat whose carrying an embryo and
you’ve exposed it to the drug in utero, which affects both the mother and the pups in
utero. But what those pups in utero are also carrying is also the primordial germ cells
for the next generation after that. So, you’re not only affecting the pups you’re actually
affecting the germ cells that are going to contribute to the next generation. So, it looks
like you’re getting a trans-generational effect because the pups affected and when they
give birth to their next set they’re affected too but in actual fact if you take those and
propagate those they don’t have it because it stops. Because they weren’t exposed and
the ones that survive are, obviously, more likely the healthy ones than the other ones.
Finally, Respondent 6 accounted for his scepticism in terms of an evolution-
ary logic. He could ‘see arguments about why’ transgenerational inheritance
‘would be a very bad thing for an organism’; speciﬁcally, if DNAmethylation was
inherited,
you can imagine if that keeps happening over generations eventually you’re going to
cumulate methylation everywhere. And you’re just going to gum up the organism and
it’s not going to work anymore. So, that’s one very important reason why we have re-
programming between the generations. To reset the, if you like, the modiﬁcations so
you can start on a new template all over again, that is determined and directed by the
genetic programme, genetics, transcription pathways and signalling. So, that would be
my view because otherwise I think we end up in a form of Lysenkoism which I think is
utter nonsense.
Similar criticisms were advanced by Respondent 8, who also spoke of evolution-
ary logics, and felt that ‘a lot of the evidence [for transgenerational inheritance] in
my opinion is suspect. Partly because the effects are absolutely tiny’. Ultimately,
he concluded:
I would like people to get over the transgenerational thing. There are interesting exam-
ples as I mentioned, but it’s not the be all and end all, and I would like to get mecha-
nistically, a better understanding of how genes are regulated. Because, actually it’s all
a bit mysterious at the moment and we’re making progress but it’s, erm, er there are
still some big unanswered questions. So I’m excited about the ﬁeld, but I’m frustrated
really by the distraction of some of these other aspects.
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While some evidence that transgenerational inheritance is possible circulates
within journals and elsewhere, other commentaries suggest a more cautious ap-
praisal of this notion.6 The scientists weighed claims regarding transgenerational
inheritance throughout the interviews, largely situating their accounts within
a register of ‘epistemic modesty’ (cf. Will, 2010). In doing so, they contribute
to ‘deciding the [perceived] character’ of biological processes and ontologies
(cf. Collins, 1975: 220). Indeed, studies of transgenerational inheritance (and
behavioural epigenetics) seemed to appear as ‘alien science’ (Collins, 1999;
Hedgecoe, 2006) to some of the respondents: that is, research that attracted in-
terest and excitement to those conversant with or excited by work in epigenetics,
but which was less compelling to senior scientists who had spent many years
studying methylation, chromatin biology, and the like. This ‘alien science’ was
concerning to most of the biologists I spoke with once it became taken as simply
‘science’, and in particular when that was within discursive arenas populated by
non-scientiﬁc publics. Hence, it is to public engagements with epigenetics that we
now turn.
Communicating epigenetics
Notwithstanding deﬁnitional difficulties and uncertainties over the salience of
transgenerational inheritance, there are – in Respondent 3’s words – also ‘a lot of
issues, [ . . . ] about the interpretation of the results, in epigenetics’. In particular:
if you ﬁnd an epigenetic signature in people with a disease, it’s extremely difficult to
decide if this epigenetic signature has something to do with the development of the
disease or is a consequence of the disease. Which means that causality is extremely
difficult to, to assess in epigenetics. Plus all the problem[s] we havewith technical things,
which means that most of the work done in epigenetics today were extremely targeted
or using genome-wide analysis that were very, very modest. So, the arrays that we use,
for instance, analyse only 5 per cent of the, what we call the epigenome.
Respondent 1 also noted the difficulties in parsing causation and correlation in
epigenetics, as well as stating that ‘people doing non-epigenetic work are very
critical of it’. When I asked Respondent 1 what other scientists were critical of,
he replied:
In that it is an epiphenomenon. That erm in fact the genes are driving things and it’s
driven by gene expression, not the other way round, and er it’s sort of just reﬂecting
the atmosphere, the environment. Like a bit of litmus paper that’s quite useful, but
it’s not the main driver of what’s happening. Erm, and then to, and whilst that should
be still great, to the genetics community that’s seen as a major negative, because they’re
very much focused on the genetic point of view. And they see, a lot of genetic people
see epigenetics as a threat [due to changing patterns of funding].
On the other hand, Respondent 8 seemed to suggest that there was not enough
self-criticism and epistemic modesty on the part of some researchers involved
in epigenetics: pointing to what he called ‘the evangelical wing of the epige-
netics area’, he was ‘deeply suspicious’ of ostentatious presentations of ‘the old
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paradigm of genes and genetics’ as ‘old hat’ – in particular, when simultaneously
positing as a ‘revolution’ the notion that ‘stuff that happens in the environment
can write information, or at least alter information in your epigenome’, and is
also heritable transgenerationally. Respondent 8 had little time for investigators
who undertook public engagement (eg TED talks) ‘using their scientiﬁc creden-
tials’ to articulate implications about epigenetics that he felt were not based on
hard science (that, indeed, were ‘myths’). He felt that this was ‘damaging’, and
that ‘scientists should be the last people who propagate delusion’. Further:
if you were to ask me, what the ethical problems with epigenetics are, I’d say, using
rubbish data to inﬂuence people’s behaviour through pseudo-science. That’s would I
would say is the big ethical risk of epigenetics.7
Though less emotive and less targeted towards other scientists, Respondent 3
also appeared to disdain some of the manifestations of epigenetics within public
discourse, especially when reported in the media. For him, epigenetics is: ‘always
kind of tabloid news. I think that our, it’s our grandfather is responsible for our
obesity or, the, the kind of story that’s, er, which amuse people more than really
is important for science.’ Distaste was expressed too by Respondent 6 over some
of the ways the term ‘epigenetics’ had come to circulate beyond biomedicine, and
in particular the claims that adhered to it:
So the problem is, I mean, you may have seen this, I don’t know where, if you started
going to that area where you get that boundary between science, and I have to say non-
science, you start to ﬁnd people, they’re very clever, they’re very intuitive, they want to
ﬁnd things in, but they go off into areas of the internet that I wouldn’t want to really
delve in, almost from the point of view of contaminating myself, but, you know, you
end up with these people like, which are lifestyle coaches, who are going to make you
a better person by changing your epigenetic proﬁle. Eat a lot of cabbage or something,
I don’t know. And, you know, they’re just charlatans. They’re just snake oil salesmen,
who are just selling you a ridiculous idea.
Regardless of such concerns, however, the respondents were generally positive
about communicating their research to an audience outside of bioscience; Re-
spondent 1, for instance, stated that he enjoyed public engagement, and especially
trying to ‘convey some of the excitement that is coming out of science at the mo-
ment’. Yet, this was not a set of activities that the scientists I interviewed were
very regularly involved with – although Respondent 7’s sentiments that he was
‘increasingly aware that I should do!’ seemed shared across the sample. For those
who had participated in science communication and engagement events, involve-
ment was generally somewhat recent, and occasionally linked to funder requests;
for example, Respondent 5 noted that much of his work had been sponsored by
one large charity and he felt that ‘I do owe them’.
Respondents 2 and 4 both reﬂected on the necessity of communicating explic-
itly about epigenetics. In the words of the latter:
I think ﬁrstly it’s a growing ﬁeld of science, clearly. And so then therefore you know
it’s important that the public knows, because part of their tax money goes to funding
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epigenetics, so I think they should know about it. I think that they should experience if
they can the same excitement of new knowledge that’s being created that we are excited
about. Because it really, in my opinion, enriches humankind to have new knowledge.
Just as simple as that. So I think that’s really important. And-and I think also as dogma
gets replaced by other dogma, the genome has had a stranglehold for a long time and
I think it’s important to show that there’s other views of biology, selection, inheritance
which are emerging that give you different ways of thinking aboutMendel and Darwin
et cetera. And ﬁnally there is hope for treatments, but that hope is very early. So you
probably know that there is epigenetic drugs in the clinic. They show some promise.
They are very unspeciﬁc. [ . . . ] But there are strategies for going into the epigenome in
a much more focused and targeted way to change it. And I think that’s also important,
that people get to know about that even if it’s very early days and we can’t tell them,
well, we’re going to cure this disease and that disease with these approaches. So I think
to me at multiple levels, it’s, it’s good for the public to know about it.
Respondent 4 was also reﬂective about the ambiguous position of scientists si-
multaneously positioning epigenetics as exciting and important, while also not-
ing its associated uncertainties:
I’m very excited about epigenetics and the potential that it has. But I’m also very con-
scious that it gets overhyped and there are scientists that are less cautious in portraying
it out there. And my personal view of that is that that’s, er . . . I wouldn’t say not the
right thing to do, because there’s this balance of actually bringing it to the attention of
the public, which is important. And how do you do that without overhyping it? I don’t
know, because people want stories, you know, people, people pick up stories and they
want to relate to their own lives.
He felt that ‘we probably need a mixture of voices to the public, since ‘it’s not a
thing that is a scientiﬁc fact, that the scientiﬁc community agrees on’. In effect,
Respondent 4 indicates the challenges of scientists working within regimes both
of hope and of truth (Moreira and Palladino, 2005) – challenges that are made
more acute by the very real hopes expressed by some of the publics with whom
he had communicated. Reﬂecting on an event at which he had recently spoken,
Respondent 4 suggested:
the underlying emotion there I think is that people are excited about this possibility
that they’re not not only slaves of the genome, that they could inﬂuence by whatever
magic potion the epigenome, and therefore alter and potentially undo things that have
happened to their epigenome in the past. And therefore better their lives with thismagic
potion that we’re supposed to come up at some point with! [laughs]
When I asked how he responded to this, Respondent 4 replied:
So I think that, um, I guess my response is that, these are the scientiﬁc facts that we
have now, there is clearly some ideas, experiments and evidence that nutrition and en-
vironment can inﬂuence epigenetics. But this is so diffuse in terms of identifying the
speciﬁc factors and the underlying mechanisms, that at this point there is absolutely
no speciﬁc advice that we can give to people on what they should be doing, or should
not be doing, that, that could, that could help with this. And this then comes as a
disappointment to people obviously.
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Respondent 8 felt that he had to act as one such moderating voice at a public en-
gagement event he’d participated in. He described the difficulties of punctuating
hype whilst galvanising enthusiasm in science more broadly:
And then, so my problem is, that the idea that your environment determines what you
pass on to your offspring, or er has a long-term effect on you, via your genes in this
way, is actually quite interesting and exciting and erm novel. Andmy problem is, I have
to spend my time saying why it might not be that simple, so I come across as a little
bit of a curmudgeon, who kind of, erm er, you know perhaps a grumpy old man, who
wants people to see that biology is interesting, despite the fact that this stuff may not
be correct. And that doesn’t always work. It’s more difficult anyway.
These data underscore the affective responses of scientists to their research
(Keller, 1983; Koppman et al., 2015; Pickersgill, 2012), made manifest espe-
cially with regards to the concerns of some respondents that biological ﬁndings
and concepts are being communicated ‘inappropriately’. Such emotion seems to
speak to deep, decades-long commitment to research, and to scientists’ roles as,
ultimately, seekers of biomedical truth. My respondents, I suggest, care about
the production of knowledge, about the enthusiasm that this can stimulate in
non-scientists, and about the importance of precision in communicating devel-
opments in the biosciences to those without sufficient expertise themselves to
adjudicate new claims. Such care(-work) generates ambivalence in some cases
about public engagement with epigenetics, given the need for scientists work-
ing in this area to navigate enjoinders to communicate with both modesty and
ostentation (cf. Moreria and Palladino, 2005). This ambivalence is in part a con-
sequence of the uncertainties and ambiguities around epigenetics highlighted by
the respondents (to a greater or lesser extent). Expanding societal understanding
of and excitement regarding science was taken to be a social good, but the pro-
liferation of ‘alien science’ (Collins, 1999; Hedgecoe, 2006) which was itself fed
by public fervour was deemed concerning. The texture of this concern did not
appear to be constituted through self-interest regarding the ways such (appar-
ently misplaced) enthusiasms might shape funding pathways and research tra-
jectories. Rather, concern looked to be an articulation of empathetic citizenship
within which false hopes and expectations on the part of non-scientists were to
be lamented and, where possible, minimized – especially when they might come
to shape policy directives and the lives of the people they target.
Discussion
We can see that there is a lack of consensus within bioscience over the meaning
of epigenetic effects, mechanisms, and even the word itself. There are (affective)
corollaries to such ambiguities when scientists communicate with their peers
and with wider publics, particularly regarding the contested topic of trans-
generational inheritance.8 Yet, in spite of professed uncertainties, and evident
disagreement around the meanings and nature of epigenetic processes, scientists
are hardly paralysed; indeed, my interviewees were selected precisely because
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of their energetic research activity. Accordingly, this study underscores a point
made by Rheinberger (2010) and others (Lloyd and Raikel, 2014a; Pickersgill,
2014): speciﬁcally, conceptual lability and instability do not necessarily impede
biomedical innovation, but can instead drive it forward. As various ambiguities
endure and disagreements proliferate, a range of research trajectories are un-
dertaken in response; hence, uncertainty is part of the knowledge machinery of
scientiﬁc practice (cf. Moreira et al., 2009). Such uncertainty relates not simply
to ‘what is (un)known’ about the biological world, but more importantly refers
to potentially more intractable questions regarding the accepted theoretical and
material starting points for addressing this issue.
Frank admissions of uncertainty, ambiguity and opacity can be taken as an in-
stantiation of ‘epistemic modesty’ (cf. Will, 2010). Catherine Will has described
the rhetorical effectiveness of ‘gestures of therapeutic and epistemic modesty’
(Will, 2010: 547) within clinical texts as a means of galvanizing support for re-
search. In employing the term ‘epistemic modesty’ here, I take seriously the idea
that reﬂexive awareness of the limits of scientiﬁc knowledge is one of the ‘opera-
tive norms of performance’ (Freidson, 1970: 160) in the life sciences. It is precisely
because of this, I suggest, that expressions of modesty are an effective strategy by
which to communicate scientiﬁc professionalism, render problematic the research
of competitors, and propel innovation. In turn, the instrumental uses to which
the rhetoric of modesty can be put further embed its (reciprocally) constitutive
role in biomedical practice.
The relationship of an ethos of epistemic modesty to an ethic of scientiﬁc pro-
fessionalism renders more legible the sometimes strongly worded concerns of my
respondents around the communication of epigenetics to non-scientists. In par-
ticular, the controversial notion of transgenerational inheritance was sometimes
conﬁgured as a kind of ‘alien science’ (Collins, 1999; Hedgecoe, 2006) – that is,
knowledge often deemed deﬁcient in facticity to subject specialists, but highly
compelling to those adjacent to or acquainted with the ﬁeld. This ‘alien science’
occasionally provoked ire, frustration or exasperation in respondents as they re-
ﬂected on the communication practices of other researchers. Some unease about
public discussion of epigenetics more generally was also evident in the interview
accounts; for example, because it might (over-)inﬂate hopes and expectations.
These emotions, I suggest, respond to the performance of a perceived immod-
esty by other scientists. In otherwords, awill to speakmodestly is generative of af-
fect when an inappropriate failure to do so is noted elsewhere. This occurs even as
wider expectations to boldly articulate one’s professional and scientiﬁc achieve-
ments continue to increase. That these expectations are so strikingly apparent
within universities, and immodestly allowed (indeed, encouraged) in various con-
texts, implies two interlocking ‘regimes’ of scientiﬁc praxis (cf. Moreira and
Palladino, 2005). First, a regime of epistemic modesty; second, a regime of what
we might term ‘epistemic ostentatiousness’ – namely, a rather more ﬂamboyant
display of scientiﬁc knowledge that while not deceitful nevertheless presents the
‘best side’ of research and of researchers to a range of audiences. Part of being a
‘responsible’ scientist, it seems, is to knowwhen, in both public and professionals
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forums, to adopt the appropriate register of modesty or ostentation – a trick that
relates to the wider scientiﬁc consensus on the epistemic domain in question.
The scientiﬁc uncertainties and discomfort with epistemic ostentatiousness
documented here are pertinent to social scientists, who have become ‘excited’
(Niewo¨hner, 2011: 280) about epigenetics, and especially transgenerational
inheritance. Such excitement is a signiﬁcant affective aspect of the knowledge
machinery of the social sciences, and the efforts of scholars to theorize with and
through epigenetics. Tolwinkski has reﬂected that assumptions can sometimes
be made that a ‘fundamental and paradigmatic change’ is taking place within
the biosciences regarding epigenetics (Tolwinski, 2013: 382). However, as she
has documented for the US, and I have shown in the UK, this assumption might
not bear out. While the epistemic modesty of my respondents may partly reﬂect
attempts to position themselves as certain kinds of (responsible) scientists, their
emotional responses to perceived ostentation in others’ claims-making (in both
scientiﬁc and public forums) further points to dissensus in the biosciences re-
garding epigenetics. This corresponds too with the careful caveats that circulate
within scientiﬁc texts in this area (Pickersgill et al., 2013). If anything character-
izes research on epigenetic marks and mechanisms, it is perhaps a reﬂective lack
of consensus on the nature and biological signiﬁcance of the processes under
examinations.
As scholars in sociology, anthropology and elsewhere are engaging increas-
ingly with epigenetics research, they are implicitly (and sometimes explicitly)
weighing the claims of life scientists. Accordingly, social scientists themselves
come to contribute to ‘deciding the [assumed] character’ of biological processes
and ontologies (cf. Collins, 1975: 220), within the academy and beyond. Such
a contribution might not be considered problematic to scholars seeking to
‘re-vitalize’ (Rose, 2013) the social sciences, and work in a more collaborative
fashion with bioscientists. However, given enthusiasm for transgenerational
inheritance, and bioscientiﬁc uncertainty regarding precisely this matter, the
potential exists for sociologists to co-produce an ‘alien science’ that may dis-
affect the very communities of life scientists with which scholars are seeking to
collaborate. Moreover, though collaboration with biologists has been described
as a way to move ‘beyond description, commentary and critique’ (Rose, 2013:
23), the idiom of ‘beyond’ implies an epistemological hierarchy which seems
unlikely to be helpful to social scientiﬁc collaborators of life scientists. Finally,
those energized by such possibilities have sometimes articulated these through
a rather ideational register. Yet, sociological fashion – as the work of sociol-
ogists of fashion reminds us (Mears, 2011) – relates closely to perceptions of
economic value and processes of valuation. Within biomedicine, money ‘carves
deep interdisciplinary tracks’ (Rapp, 2011: 673), and the different kinds of
capital available to social scientists wanting to engage with epigenetics could
be signiﬁcant. This issue invites further reﬂection on behalf of sociologists
regarding the incorporation of bioscientiﬁc claims within their own knowledge
machinery.
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Conclusion
This paper has documented some of the various contestations and uncertainties
in epigenetics (centring especially on transgenerational inheritance), and the
concerns scientists have about the communication of research in this area. As
biology and sociology potentially move closer into alignment, the allure of the
former comes to be part of the knowledge machinery of the latter. This certainly
does not preclude (open-mindedness towards) new relationships between the life
and social sciences (Landecker and Panofsky, 2013; Lock, 2015; Pickersgill et al.,
2013). Yet, scientiﬁc research articulated through a regime of epistemic modesty
is perhaps less attractive to social scientists than that situated in a regime of
epistemic ostentatiousness, with ramiﬁcations for (continued) collaboration with
bioscientists working in epigenetics.
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Notes
1 The sampling strategy appears to have been successful, in terms of interviewing notable scien-
tists, since some respondents recommended as potential interviewees individuals that I had already
approached.
2 The shortest interview took place over the phone; all others took place in the participants’ offices.
3 All italicizations within quotes reﬂects the emphasis in the participants’ talk.
4 Speciﬁcally, in relation to the possibilities of transgenerational inheritance in animals. The scien-
tists seemed comfortable with the notion that this process had been clearly established in plants.
5 Respondent 3 also had strong words on where studies evidencing transgenerational inheritance
were published, dismissing one key journal as a ‘tabloid’.
6 Some of the uncertainties in epigenetics, and transgenerational inheritance especially, have also
been ﬂagged by Landecker and Panofsky, 2013; Lloyd and Raikel, 2014b; Lock, 2015; Meloni and
Testa, 2014; Niewo¨hner, 2011; and Tolwinski, 2013.
7 Here, Respondent 8 is implicitly referencingmy study Participant Information Sheet and the open-
ing interview preamble, both of which noted that my research sought to ‘understand what social
and ethical issues scientists working in epigenetics judge to be important’.
8 Evidence for these points comes from interviews with key scientists, but the issues highlighted are
apparent across editorials, review articles and research papers in bioscientiﬁc journals (see also
Tolwinski, 2013).
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